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Abstract 
In implementing performance-based logistics (PBL), the need for several resources 
like inventory investment decreases.  Therefore, the contractor’s profit, which was based on 
the level of these resources, may decrease.  Therefore, a contractor may have disincentives 
to implement and use PBL.  One way to handle such a situation is to develop financial 
models to assist with profit/cost sharing during the implementation of PBL.  Another way is 
to study the broader topic of contractor incentives in PBL to find appropriate ways to 
motivate the contractors to enhance their performance.  While most literature in PBL 
mentions the importance of contractor incentives, not much research has been conducted in 
this topic.  With such situations in mind, this research program proposes a framework to 
study and develop appropriate possible contractor incentives to succeed in the PBL 
environment.  Our proposed framework considers the possibility of financial and non-
financial contractor incentives to ensure PBL success.  We anticipate that the final results of 
this research program will be useful in the defense and related public- and private-sector 
organizations to maximize the overall benefits of PBL projects.  This paper provides a 







PBL is the desired product support strategy in the DoD, and it is being integrated into 
legacy programs as well as into new contracts (Berkowitz, Gupta, Simpson & McWilliams, 
2005; Vitasek et al., 2008; Vitasek & Geary, 2008).  It is used by all services at the 
component, system, and subsystem levels of procurement, sustainment and support (Geary 
& Vitasek, 2008).   PBL came to the forefront of government procurement because a better 
method was needed.  Therefore, the implementation of PBL was included in September 
2001 in “the Quadrennial Defense Review and initial guidance was issued by the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD)” (Aguilar, Estrada & Myers, 2005, p. 13).  The 
implementation of PBL is important because it gives the program manager (PM) the ability to 
improve reliability, reduce the logistical burden, and save money on Total Life Cycle Costs 
(Kim, Cohen & Netessine, 2007). 
Since PBL is relatively new, it had to be successfully integrated into thousands of 
legacy contracts and new programs.  To effectively do this, the idea of Total Life Cycle 
Systems Management was propagated around the service branches (Edwards & Nash, 
2007; Kratz & Buckingham, 2010). “Total Life Cycle Systems Management emphasizes an 
early focus on sustainment in the program management office, making the PM responsible 
for all activities associated with the acquisition, development, production, fielding, 
sustainment, and disposal of a weapon system across its life cycle” (Aguilar et al., 2005, p. 
13).   This is the main difference from older procurement methods because they focused 
solely on the early phases.  PBL is a major jump forward in how government procurement 
and sustainment is done and contract types and incentives need to readapt so they can 
successfully support the contract (Barber, 2008). 
The Department of Defense and the Military Services are transforming from 
traditional methods of logistics support to PBL as a methodology of product support for the 
21st century (Fowler, 2010; Kratz & Buckingham, 2010).  It makes the program managers 
responsible for total life cycle costs (DAU, 2005).  Traditionally, support for MWSs in the 
DoD centered around 10 logistics elements, split between acquisition-related activities at the 
front end of the life cycle and sustainment-related activities at the back end.  Metrics 
focused on the logistics elements themselves and on internal processes often having little 
direct relationship to warfighter requirements.  The shift toward Integrated Logistics Support 
attempted to combine distinct logistics elements into a coordinated approach, but there was 
still the disjointed acquisition versus sustainment-support issue and the lack of a linkage 
between supportability measures and warfighter needs (Vitasek & Murray, 2009).  The 
advent of Total Life Cycle Systems Management (TLCSM) and performance-based logistics 
(PBL) addressed all of these issues  (DeVries, 2005). 
TLCSM mandated a new focus by PMs toward the entire life cycle, firmly linking 
acquisition and sustainment activities into an integrated process.  This was a significant 
paradigm shift from PMs traditional focus on the early stages (acquisition, development, 
fielding) of the life cycle.  To measure success, PBL required that supportability metrics be 
directly related to performance outcomes for the warfighter.  PBL also offered a choice of 
organic and commercial support providers for picking the right combination in achieving best 
value for the program  (DeVries, 2005). 
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) identified logistics transformation as a 
key transformation pillar. Specifically, the QDR directed logistics enterprise integration, a 
reduction in logistics demand, and a reduction in the cost of logistics.  The 2003 update to 





actually put on the hook to do PBL. One tool the Department of Defense (DoD) identified for 
use in achieving these goals is performance-based logistics (PBL). This tool is an innovative 
acquisition approach that represents a cultural shift away from buying parts to buying 
performance. In practice, application of PBL can be at the system, subsystem, or major 
assembly level.  Executed through long-term incentive based contracts, PBL is a means of 
system sustainment that integrates supplier support and warfighter requirements with the 
objective of improving operational readiness while reducing costs. In today’s environment of 
constrained budgets and reduced manpower, PBL represents a potentially cost-effective 
and efficient method for system sustainment (Lewis, 2005; Mahon, 2007). 
It has been said, “it simply makes good business sense to provide the proper 
contract motivations to encourage high-quality contractor performance.”  It is this notion of 
“good business sense” that we would like to examine further.  Within the construct of 
performance-based logistics (PBL), contracts have been written to try and motivate 
contractors to meet the expectations of the government by constructing incentives that 
greater serve the needs of the contractor.  This implies that if a contractor is performing well, 
then the proper incentives must be in place.  Assuming that is the case, we want to ask the 
following: what were those incentives, what was the methodology (i.e., “best practices”) for 
selecting those incentives, and would a consistent pattern between the types of incentives 
and levels of performance indicate the use (or lack) of “best practices,” when developing 
these incentives had a hand in a firm’s level of performance? (Gilbreth & Hubbard, 2008; 
Graham, 2003; Hildebrandt, 1998). 
The incentives given to a contractor can be either monetary, non-monetary, or both.  
Several metrics exist that allow government contracting officers to objectively evaluate the 
performance of a contractor (Doerr, Lewis & Eaton, 2005).  Monetary incentives could be 
based upon, but are not limited to, the following: material availability, material reliability, and 
life cycle cost, all at the system level.  Delivery schedule incentives focus on getting a 
contractor to meet or exceed minimum delivery requirements.  Under a performance-based 
construct, the parties involved have relative autonomy in negotiating the terms and 
conditions for meeting the target delivery dates.  Performance standards are defined in a 
PBC and the incentives are typically given on the basis of whether the contractor met the 
performance criteria and to what extent they exceeded the standard (Tremaine, 2008).  In 
other words, performance incentives are designed to relate profit to the contractor’s 
achieved results.   
Several types of performance incentives are fee structures, bonuses, and/or shared 
savings, and they can be applied in many different ways for many different reasons; some 
examples of these are as follows:  
– First, an award fee can be given if the government feels that the 
contractor meets or exceeds specified outcomes.  
– Second, an incentive can be given if the contractor appropriately 
controls costs in a cost plus-incentive-fee contract.   
– Third, reliability-based profits allow for increased profits (as in FFP 
contracts), if the contractor can lower their operating costs by meeting 
higher product reliability standards.  So, they can retain at least a 
substantial portion of the profits by making a better product.   
– Fourth, shared savings is another unique type of bonus because both 





from performance enhancements, design improvements, and other 
efficiency improvements (Kirk & DePalma, 2005, p. 40). 
Since PBL is now the preferred procurement and system support program, it is 
important to know how to incentivize contractors to perform consistently at a high level.  
However, this is a unique problem considering that PBL is new and little is known about 
what best practices and incentives should be suggested.  As a result, it is important to look 
at the different types of contracts the government can issue before discussing how 
incentives can be given under PBLs oversight. 
Contract Types 
Fixed-price and cost-plus contracts will elicit different contractor responses based 
upon the inherent nature of the two types.  When a contractor is awarded a fixed-price 
contract, we feel that the contractor is motivated to reduce product support costs because 
the awarded amount is fixed; therefore, every dollar saved through cost reduction is an 
additional dollar of profit contribution.  Knowing this, we argue that firms operating under 
fixed-price contracts should be inherently motivated to reduce costs because the cost of not 
doing so will reduce that firm’s profit potential.  And when firms that operating under an FP 
construct experience cost overruns, we have to consider whether the incentives being 
offered were consistent with performance goals. 
Under a fixed-price construct, there are essentially two widely used incentive-type 
contracts: (1) fixed-price-incentive-fee (FPIF) and (2) fixed-price-award-fee (FPAF).  FPIF 
contracts are based upon a formula that relates final negotiated cost to target cost—these 
targets could be either firm target or successive targets.  The formula used is made up of 
variables that can be objectively determined (i.e., cost, schedule, performance).  
Sometimes, Award Fee elements are in fact things that can be objectively measured, but an 
Award Fee approach is chosen.  Award Fees are easier to administer and allow more 
flexibility on the part of the government. 
Cost reimbursement (or cost-plus) contracts are appropriate and largely used in the 
developmental stages of the product/project life cycle, where costs are essentially 
unpredictable. When a contractor is awarded a cost-plus contract, there is typically too much 
ambiguity in the project to assign a fixed price to the end product; therefore, the cost risk for 
the government is usually greater when cost-plus contracts are used rather than fixed-price.  
This ambiguity is the result of many things, including technological maturity, political 
uncertainty, etc.  Contractors typically enjoy the freedoms associated with cost-plus 
contracts because the cost risk associated with a particular project or program is shifted to 
the government.  It is noteworthy that development costs often exceed production costs 
associated with a product ready for use, even if the product is produced well beyond 
maturity, when per unit product costs drastically decline. 
Taking these thoughts into consideration, we argue that because contractors run a 
greater risk of financial loss (due largely to the uncertainty associated with cost-plus 
contracts), the choosing of incentives should be seen as a much more sensitive and delicate 
process in the eyes of the contractor.  If this proves to be true, then the types of incentives 
used by the government for a particular product could have a significant impact on how 





Incentives for the Government 
The Firm Fixed-Price (FFP) contract is the desired contract for the government, as it 
firmly fixes pricing parameters, shifting the risk of cost overruns to the contractor.  When the 
product life cycle inevitably requires conceptual development and prototyping, the 
government seeks to accelerate the product to maturity so that FFP contracts become 
appropriate. The government is subject to congressional funding and the government must 
show performance to justify funding, which also creates an added incentive to perform 
responsibly.  
Cost-plus contracts are appropriate and largely used in the early developmental 
stages of the product or project life cycle when the costs are unpredictable. This is not the 
desired contact type for the government, but it is necessary to reimburse the contractor for 
unpredictable and volatile costs. The cost-plus contracts shift the risk to the government as 
they are obliged to cover unpredictable developmental costs within contractual guidelines.  It 
is noteworthy that the developmental costs often exceed the productions costs associated 
with a product ready for use, even if the product is produced well beyond maturity, when per 
unit product costs drastically decline. 
This brings to mind the “S-curve,” prominently known in marketing, where the 
product begins as a concept and is then brought to the market seeking adoption; then, the 
product or service is improved and adopted by a large portion of the market; finally, it 
reaches maturity, pending obsolescence.  As shown in Figure 1, the maturity stage 
essentially predicts obsolescence and prompts replacement with a new product (Visitask, 
2010). 
 
Figure 1.  
The government still reserves the right to “terminate for convenience,” which 
absolves the government from future obligation to the contract (GSA, DoD & NASA, 2010).  
It should also be noted that it is paramount to the government to specify parameters of 
contract performance, which shifts the risk to the contractor, because a nebulous contract 
would give too much discretion to the contractor. This situation creates somewhat of a 
dilemma considering that one of the basic tenants of PBL is that the government is to 
basically specify what it wants, while allowing the contractor to determine the means of 





Incentives for Contractors 
Under the PBL strategy, the contractor assumes a greater amount of risk; this, 
however, gives the contractor more latitude in determining and applying its methods 
(KMC/OPI, 2010).  The general consensus, identified through research and personal 
interviews, is that the continuation of a contract is the main incentive.  Continuation simply 
allows more time for the contractor to recoup capital investment expenses and provides 
added stability and continuity of staff, expertise, and equipment (P. Cushman, personal 
communication, October 2009). The general idea derived from the interviews was that a 
contract term should last at least five years to allow time for the contractor to recoup its 
capital investment (D. Wilson, personal communication, October 2009). Incentives can be 
tied to the performance of metrics as they relate to cost, quality, or delivery. For instance, 
under an FFP contract, a contractor may keep at least a portion of dollars saved when 
below budget, and it may receive bonuses for reaching certain metrics stated in the contract. 
This is apparent in cost-plus contracts because the contractor is incentivized to keep 
costs and timeframe to a minimum so that it may win continuation of the contract.  Even if 
the contractor is reimbursed for cost overruns, it runs the risk of congressional scrutiny and 
termination either by convenience or in favor of another contractor, so corporate reputation 
is at stake on every contract (GSA et al, 2010, p. 1). The reputation of a company may be 
the most important factor in contract rewards, and it’s dependent on how they perform in 
every contract (Defense, 2010, p. 1).  For example, Boeing’s poor performance during the 
competition for the Joint Strike Fighter, contrasted by a relatively better performance by, 
undoubtedly influenced other contract awards, as evidenced by the recent proliferation of 
Lockheed contracts (High Stakes, 2010, p. 1).  
Types of PBL Incentives 
In order for a PBL contract to be successful, the contractor has to meet standards 
established in the contract.  To ensure the standards are met, the cost to provide the 
required level of service is estimated to the best of the government’s and the contractor’s 
abilities.  However, complications can arise and levels of achievement can be met that 
warrant additional compensation like bonuses, shared savings, or other forms.  Examples of 
complications are project risks, adjusted product usage, and increases in the price of used 
resources or components.  Aside from that, superior performance levels can be outlined in 
the contract that also warrant an incentive when met.  It is important to have incentives and 
bonuses as a part of PBL contracts because they can increase the probability that the 
contract is fulfilled and the warfighter receives the necessary support on time (High Stakes, 
2010, p. 40).  While the topic of contractor incentives is mentioned in various research 
studies (Beggs, Ertel & Jones, 2005), it is not explored to the extent of developing a 
framework for determining such incentives in specific situations. 
Proposed Framework 
Before moving on, it is important to understand that incentives can be given in many 
different forms, but they fall into three categories: cost-based incentives, time-based 
incentives, and scope-base incentives.  Cost-based incentives focus on contractor profits, 
so monetary awards are a good example of this type of incentives.  Time-based incentives 
are changes in the length of the contract, so the life of the contract is extended for the 
contractor.  Scope-based incentives are changes in the contract that give the contractor 





the most impact on contractor performance, it is important to separate these incentives 
because different types of incentives work better with different types of contracts. 
Cost-based Incentives 
Of all of the incentives that are considered, the most important type of incentive 
considered is the contract type.  This is because contract types vary in their treatment and 
allocation of cost, schedule, and performance risk.  FAR Part 16 defines contracts as being 
one of two types: (1) fixed-price or (2) cost-reimbursement.  When deciding how to match 
incentives with the contractual mechanism being used, the contracting officer needs to look 
at where most of the responsibilities and risk lie.  Under a fixed-price (FP) construct, the 
contractor assumes all responsibility and risk of fulfilling the contract and providing a 
product, whereas under a cost-reimbursement construct (i.e., cost-plus contracts), the 
government reimburses certain allowable and allocable costs, and pays the contractor a fee 
that is in line with the contractual agreement.  The inherent downside in using cost-
reimbursement contracts is the lack of motivation on the part of the contractor to reduce 
costs.  As one might suspect, the type of contract that is appropriate for a particular task 
depends upon several variables, but for the purpose of our research, we want to evaluate 
the types of incentives being used and determine their overall ability to influence the 
behavior of the contractor.   
Because PBL is focused on system availability and performance metrics, it is 
important for the contractor to understand what is expected of them.  An example of metrics 
being linked to profits is how “the TOW-ITAS contract directly links profitability to 
availability—the higher the availability the greater the profit the supplier can earn” (DAU, 
2005, pp. 3-23). In this example, in order to link availability to profitability, the acceptable 
level is determined by the program office and is included in the performance-based 
agreement (PBA).  The first step in meeting the objectives stated in a PBL contract is 
deciding on a cost that will cover the desired support.  Once the PM decides on a cost, it 
needs to be accepted by stakeholders before the PM can enter into a formal agreement with 
the contractor.  Finally, the level of support provided needs to be appropriately covered by 
compensation in order for the contract to be appealing to competent companies.   
The written agreement between the contractor and the government becomes a part 
of the PBL support strategy, and the expectations of the contractor are outlined in the user 
agreement section of the PBA.  The user agreement part of the PBA contains the ranges 
and objectives that the contractor has to meet.  “Typically, the agreement identifies ranges 
of outcome performance with thresholds and objectives, and the target price (cost to the 
user) for each level of PBL capability” (DAU, 2005, pp. 3-17). Since the contract is based on 
ranges and objectives, resources will be allocated to the contractor on the basis of what is 
expected from the weapon system or component in a particular year.  It is important to note 
that unique conditions may require performance above normal operations, and the policy will 
adapt to meet these conditions.  For instance, “PBL agreements should be flexible enough 
to address a range of support requirements, so as to accommodate changes in OPTEMPO 
or execution year funding, including surge or contingency requirements to the extent that 
they can be defined” (DAU, 2005, pp. 3-18). An example of this is the Shadow Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle contract, which “procures performance using measurable metrics instead of 
buying spares and repairs in the traditional manner.  This example demonstrates the 
establishment of a schedule for the transition from Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) to 
PBL based on lessons learned from operational usage in the user environment” (DAU, 





requirements and ranges that need to be met in the contract and how to deal with wear and 
tear changes, like the Shadow UAV contract. 
When getting involved in a contract with the government, it is important for the 
contractor to understand the level of risk they are being asked to assume.  One of the main 
components of PBLs is that it moves risk away from the government and to the contractor. 
“While DoD can never completely delegate risk for system operational performance, PBL 
strategies move the level of risk away from DoD to the support provider, commensurate with 
the scope of support for which the support provider is responsible” (DAU, 2005, pp. 3-20). 
Risk is an important part of performance-based agreements because it affects how the PM 
defines an acceptable level of performance, cost, and incentives.  This means that the 
government will design its PBL contracts in a way that makes assuming risks appealing to 
the contractor.  Properly compensating parties for taking risks is an important part of 
successful PBL contracts, and if it is done correctly, then risk to the government will be 
significantly reduced. 
Time-based Incentives 
PBL incentives are generally tied to the contract type and overall performance, so 
additional compensation is typically given for exceeding the standards as stipulated by the 
contract.  For example, “in most cases, providing incentives for PBL contracts is difficult 
considering the many different types of contracts that may be used” (DAU, 2005, pp. 3-19).  
Giving incentives in respect to PBAs means that incentives are given based on meeting the 
metrics set in the contract, but, in general, the PBL wants to tie incentives to overall 
performance (D. Ioasco, personal communication, October 2009).  “The preferred PBL 
contracting approach is the use of long-term contracts with the incentives tied to 
performance” (DAU, 2005, p. 3-19).  This will help the contractor make technological 
investments to improve the system performance, with the hope of making relatively more 
profit in the long-term.  Klevan (2008) reports that most Navy PBL contracts are long-term 
agreements and address availability, obsolescence, reliability, and cost.  He further reports 
that the use of such time-based incentives creates a win-win strategy, incorporates surge 
capability, mitigates risks and ensures an exit strategy.  Such long-term agreements create 
government-contractor partnerships that result in significant improvements in the key 
performance parameters specified in the PBL agreements (Klevan 2008).  It enables the 
government to procure the “end-state” and not the “how-to.”  Thus, using overall 
performance as a basis for rewarding long-term contracts incentivizes the best companies in 
the industry to apply for contracts in hopes that they will receive future business (S. 
Kowerduck, personal communication, October 2009). 
Scope-based Incentives 
While cost-based and time-based incentives are in use, scope-based incentives are 
not much in use, but may provide motivation to the contractor to significantly improve its 
performance under the PBL.  This incentive is based on the assumption that a contractor 
wishes to expand its business with the government.  If the contractor’s performance under a 
PBL contractor exceeds the government’s expectation, then the contractor can be given 
work beyond the scope of the original contract.  For example, if the original PBL contract 
required a contractor to maintain an aircraft engine, then based on a superior performance 
over time, this contractor can be given the additional task of maintaining tires.  Ultimately, 
this contactor may become the system integrator, as it will become responsible for the entire 





provide incentives because the metrics are difficult to define effectively.  However, because 
of current legal restrictions and the need for competitive procurement in government, 
implementation of scope-based incentives is quite difficult, if not impossible. 
Private Sector 
The PBL strategy is formulated with the intent to improve upon older contracting 
methods and provide incentives similar to the private sector.  As a result, “it is not 
uncommon for contractors engaged in PBL contracts to have the majority—or even all—of 
their profit tied to performance-based metrics and dependent on earning the contractual 
incentives included in the contract” (DAU, 2005, pp. 3-21). Using incentives to encourage 
better contractor performance is a useful tool, but finding the right incentives and metrics is 
difficult.  For example, a commercial company is going to require different incentives than a 
depot.  One is a for profit and one is trying to breakeven; so, a depot may want the 
incentives to, among other things, reduce operating costs and encourage savings, while a 
commercial company wants profits to please their stockholders and board members.  
Applying commercial style incentives to government contracting or partnerships with the 
depots is a way to encourage the best level of performance, but the optimal incentives are 
needed in order for it to be successful. 
The private sector provides incentives based on performance, and this may improve 
the quality of the product and service provided.  In order for the government to get a better 
product, the government needs to develop a commercial mentality to incentivizing.  The 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 12 is designed to encourage the government to 
move toward using commercial processes and practices.  Incorporating commerciality into 
government procurement under FAR Part 12 can be done at multiple levels in the 
government contractor relationship.  For example, “justification for commerciality does not 
have to be made at the item level; it can be made at the repair process level or at the 
support concept level” (DAU, 2005, pp. 3-24). So, incentives should be provided at more 
than just the item level.  Under this regulation, the government can incentivize by methods 
known as the “Power by the Hour (PBH)” concept, a company’s exceptional repair 
capabilities, or a product support system. 
PBL is an important step in the right direction because it allows the government to 
incentivize like a private company by using a pricing arrangement to encourage the 
contractor to reduce costs and increase reliability to make a profit.  One way the government 
can incentivize contractors this way is by PBH.  For instance,  
under PBH, an hourly rate is negotiated and the contractor is paid in advance based 
on the forecasted operational hours for the system.  Actual hours are reconciled with 
projected hours, and overages and shortfalls are either added to or credited from the 
next period’s forecasted amounts.  Since the contractor receives funding 
independent of failures it is then incentivized to overhaul the asset the first time it 
fails so that it stays in operation as long as possible. (DAU, 2005, pp. 3-24) 
This basically encourages the contractor to touch the product as little as possible 
because the less they touch it, the more money they make.  This means that they need to 
have more support structures to reduce their defective product percents.  So, the contractor 
will develop support processes like: 
– repair/replace/overhaul, 





– engineering and logistics support, 
– packaging and shipping, and 
– configuration management. (DAU, 2005, pp. 3-26) 
All of these activities are designed to improve the production and the product’s life 
cycle support.  The private sector incentives its contractors by encouraging them to develop 
processes that will help them meet the goal and metrics in their contracts.  PBH is just one 
example of how the government can use private-company-style incentives to prompt the 
contractor to meet the metrics in the contracts.  In conclusion, FAR Part 12 is the 
government’s guide to applying commercial incentives to its procurement so that the DoD’s 
primary objective can be achieved. 
Contractors Creating Their Own Incentives 
The possibility of contractors creating their own incentives should be taken seriously, 
but it is likely to require fundamental reform of existing contractual vehicles to make it a 
reality. The contractor may propose that if its performance is exemplary that it should be 
considered for future business.  The reputation of an exemplary performer often positively 
influences prospects for follow-on business, but the award process on a government 
contract must adhere to the FAR guidelines for competitive bidding.  The creation of 
incentives is more likely to occur in subcontracting, where the dollar thresholds are lower 
and subject to less government scrutiny.  However, for optimal performance to occur, 
contractors should be more proactive in proposing creative incentives because this is likely 
to leverage organizational competencies to achieve higher performance.  
It should also be noted that a contractor may benefit greatly from using the 
technology gained from the development of one product to produce other related products. 
This is evident in thousands of examples of “spin-off” products. A program called TOCNET 
(Tactical Operation Centre Intercommunication System), which is a wireless encrypted LAN, 
was initially used by the Marines for base communications. Substantial numbers of 
additional, related products were spun-off from this technology, including a commercially 
viable product called the Coal Miner’s Phone, which allows miners to communicate 
wirelessly (Jane’s, 2010). 
Within legal guidelines, a firm is permitted to determine its own cost (managerial) 
accounting methods.  This is an evolving area in which improved metrics and evaluation are 
being developed as a result of pressure from the government and the marketplace.  For 
instance, a firm may find some means to show fewer inventories than actually in the system.  
While such a practice is a direct misrepresentation to the investor, taxpayer, and the 
government, it may be advantageous to the contractor.  Additionally, it may lead to lost 
stock, delayed payments, distortion of stock levels, and the added administrative expense 
associated with reordering.  This is an example of a metric that can be reformed.  A 
company’s discretionary ability to determine its cost accounting methods is endangered to 
some degree, especially given the corporate scandals involving “cooking the books.”  
Recently, a department within a major government contractor came in $35,000 under 
budget for the approaching end of fiscal year.  To discourage the possibility of the 
government (Congress) interpreting the under-budget situation as an over allocation, the 
contractor spent the money on office supplies. This is an example of a situation that requires 






PBL is the latest procurement and sustainment method, and it should be noted that it 
is a result of an evolutionary process.  It has, at the very least, articulated a basic strategy 
for contract performance and has brought about increased analysis and scrutiny of 
contractual performance. The improvement of metrics resulting from advances in technology 
is perhaps the greatest operational mechanism for the contractor to achieve the goals laid 
out by PBL.  The contract itself still dictates the performance and it must adhere to the FAR, 
DFARS, and TINA. Creative methods beyond the scope of the FAR are a highly risky 
proposition for the contractor and would require reform of contractual vehicles and 
regulations.  Applying the appropriate contractual type to the given program is essential 
under the current conditions, and it should reflect the applicable point in the product life 
cycle (Kratz & Buckingham, 2010).   
The deployment of PBL may put the government in the uncomfortable position of 
relinquishing control to the contractor, while still being ultimately responsible for the 
performance of the contract.  Relinquished control on the part of the government leads to 
higher government-born risk: 
Despite its apparent success, there is an inherent conflict that DoD implementers of 
PBL often face: the PBL goal of developing long-term partnerships that encourage 
investment from commercial partners is best achieved through lengthy, guaranteed 
contracts—but such contracts increase the DoD's risk in an environment that is 
intended to transfer more risk to the contractor. (Gardner, 2008) 
As a result, in order for PBL to be successful, the government needs to appropriately 
balance risk with the right level of compensation and incentives. 
While we have provided a progress report of the work done thus far on this project, a 
lot more work needs to be done to complete this framework of contractor incentives in PBL 
environment.  For example, the proposed framework needs to be verified through empirical 
means.  This requires field work to include interviews with DoD and contractor personnel, 
using PBL and focused group discussions to assess the viability and desirability of various 
types of incentives.  Such field work is also essential to identify the behavioral factors that 
result in the success or failure of various contractor incentives in the PBL environment.  This 
information can then be used to develop strategies and tactics to implement appropriate 
incentive schemes.  Subsequently, models need to be developed to identify exact 
mechanisms and algorithms to use in determining the specific levels of contractor incentives 
to use in PBL.  Thus, the topic of performance-based (or outcomes-based) logistics and life 
cycle management and the need to find and use appropriate incentives to maximize 
performance is a fruitful area of future research, both from an academic and practical 
viewpoint. 
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